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From: Anthony Appleyard <XPUM04@prime-a.central-services.umist.ac.uk>
To: KRVW <@NSFnet-Relay.AC.UK:KRVW@sei.cmu.edu>
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Subject:      Virus-L vol 0 issue #0830



Virus-L Digest Tue, 30 Aug 88, Volume 0 : Issue #0830

Today's Topics

Replies to Virus-L Comments
conference queries
Re: The Adolescence of P1
Re: conference queries
** no subject, date = Tue, 30 Aug 88 11:29:42 EDT
Virus Arguements Hit Home
CRC vs. encryption schemes
** no subject, date = Tue, 30 Aug 88 08:10:42 CDT
A few questions
Who's Sponsoring What
Re: Outline of Worm Pgms Paper in CACM
Virus Conference Concerns Update
Re: Outline of Worm Pgms Paper in CACM
Re: Virus Arguements Hit Home
Re: Outline of Worm Pgms Paper in CACM
Assurance
Re: CRC vs. encryption schemes
RE: CRC vs. encryption schemes
Loren's virus conference
conference
Re: AT configuration
Flushot trojan horse

------------------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 00:45:18 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Loren K Keim   -- Lehigh University <LKK0@LEHIGH>
Subject:      Replies to Virus-L Comments

Bernd, I have not heard of the specific incident you cited  about  a  virus
attacking  a hospital, but have heard of at least 6 more incidents. None of
the incidents were very dangerous to patients, but were apparently  written
to  attack  a  specific hospital system. I think it takes a very sick human
being to attack such systems.

Jeff, Surprizingly, you  are  the  very  first  person  to  ask  about  the
integrity of the individual vs the company. I agree with you, there is very
little I can do here to prove that I am being honest and won't run off with
your money. I will provide receipts to people along with hotel names and so
on (I had already planned on this, and even picked up a receipt book!), and
you should write in the Memo section of your check (most checks have these)
that  it is a registration fee for a virus conference, include a letter and
keep a xeroxed copy of it. If you are really worried, then mail yourself  a
xeroxed  copy of the letter the same day you send me a check and don't open
the letter. Incidently, an individual is much easier to sue than a company.
A company can just dissolve or declare bankrupcy. You can put a lien on  my
property  (THAT  IS NOT A SUGGESTION!). And you will get a cancelled check,
which is evidence itself.

NSC: When I speak of the NSC (which  individuals  have  talked  to  me  and
identified  themselves as being from this organization), I ASSUME it is the
National Security Council (Is that last word Council?) under Pres.  Reagan.
I  am  in  NO  WAY  certain  this  is  who I talked to. When I refer to the
National Computer Security Center, I am referring to an entirely  different
group.

DES: I MEANT DES, not DER... I make that mistake often.

William H. Murray: Thank you, you pointed out a few things that I missed. I
neglected to say anything about sterilizing  viruses  before  sending  them
anywhere. Its common practice, so it was something I overlooked.

Bob and others: Wasn't Miami U telling us several months back that they had
been hit by a virus which attacked Word Perfect? (Who has  a  problem  with
Word Perfect? Its a good and inexpensive word processor!)

Thank you, Loren K Keim

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 03:38:07 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         me! Jefferson Ogata <OGATA@UMDD>
Subject:      conference queries

Loren:
The check to a P.O. box is definitely out of the question, unless you
could provide a name of a reputable sponsor of the conference I could
contact.  Who is sponsoring the conference?

I am also curious as to whether there will be profits, and if so, what
will become of them.  Obviously, you can't give a definite answer as to
whether the fifty dollars apiece will be too much or too little at this
stage.  Have you had any experience organizing conferences?

I would like to know what your status is at Lehigh, and to what extent
Lehigh University is involved.  Also, how many people have sent checks?

Perhaps with this information, I would consider attending.

- Jeff Ogata

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 03:53:40 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Amanda B Rosen <abr1@CUNIXC.CC.COLUMBIA.EDU>
Subject:      Re: The Adolescence of P1
In-Reply-To:  Your message of Mon, 29 Aug 88 13:23:45 CDT

I read that book when it first came out. While the virus stuff is reasonably
accurate (the AI part is junk), my impression of the book was that it was
badly written and not immensely gripping. Still, it has been ten years or so,
so I could be wrong...

/a

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 07:56:03 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Ken van Wyk <luken@SPOT.CC.LEHIGH.EDU>
Subject:      Re: conference queries
In-Reply-To:  Your message of Tue, 30 Aug 88 03:38:07 EDT

> Who is sponsoring the conference?

Loren is.

> I would like to know what your status is at Lehigh, and to what extent
> Lehigh University is involved.

Loren is an undergraduate student here at Lehigh, in good academic
standing I believe.  Lehigh University, to the best of my knowledge,
is not involved in the conference in any way.  At least the Computing
Center certainly is not.

Ken

Kenneth R. van Wyk                   Calvin: Where do we keep the chainsaws?
User Services Senior Consultant      Mom:    We don't have any!
Lehigh University Computing Center   Calvin: None?!  Mom: None at all!
Internet: <luken@Spot.CC.Lehigh.EDU> Calvin: Then how am I supposed to learn
BITNET:   <LUKEN@LEHIIBM1>                   how to juggle?!

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 11:29:42 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         OJA@NCCIBM1

Re: Interest in THE ADOLESCENCE OF P1 /Book Search

A local used bookstore in my area has a number of slightly used copies
of the book. If anyone is interested in obtaining a copy, please
contact me by postal mail or telephone to work out arrangements.

In general, I believe that the best bet for finding this book will be
the used bookstores. Look under Science Fiction.

J.D. Abolins
301 N. Harrison Str., #197 (mail only)
Princeton, NJ 08540
(609) 292-7023

If anyone has trouble finding John Brunner's SHOCKWAVE RIDER, I believe
I have seen in the used bookstores as well. Thank you.

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 11:39:49 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         "David A. Bader" <DAB3@LEHIGH>
Subject:      Virus Arguements Hit Home

Yesterday, I was calling up this area's local BBS's, when to my
surprise, I found a feud going on.  One BBS sysop claims that a second
sysop is responsible for a virus that he somehow got.  Since FluShot
gave the receiving sysop an error message (which probably is common,
but he doesn't realize that) he feels that the virus can be traced to
the host sysop's BBS and therefore is seeking damages.. The host sysop
claims that if he is being accused and wrongly slandered that he would
consult legal authorities at his business.  I am not sure if all the
details here are 100% accurate, but I can upload a copy of the messages
in the feud here if some people are interested.

David A. Bader
DAB3@LEHIGH

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 17:20:49 +0300
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         "Y. Radai" <RADAI1@HBUNOS>
Subject:      CRC vs. encryption schemes

  A few comments on Jerry Leichter's reply to my question/challenge:

>It may very well be that, given a program P and its CRC C, with an unknown
>polynomial, I can find another program P' with the same CRC.  Note that this
>is a MUCH weaker condition than saying that I can determine the polynomial.

Agreed.  I never assumed that one had to determine the polynomial in order to
forge a CRC.  However, it's not enough to say that "it *may* be that ...".  If
you can't demonstrate a *method* for doing this in general, you won't convince
many people.  So for sake of argument, I shall assume you have in mind some-
thing like the method described by Woody Weaver in his May 17 contribution to
VIRUS-L.  If so, where do you get the set of polynomials gi(x) from?  It would
clearly be impractical to take it to be all possible polynomials (even assuming
you know the size of the generator).  So do you simply choose (say) 100 poly-
nomials at random, apply Woody's procedure, and hope for the best?  That would
take a lot of computation time, which would certainly be noticed.  And even if
it isn't, if the probability of succeeding isn't sufficiently large, the CRC
checker will sometimes notice your attempted forge, tipping off the community
to the existence of a virus.  Can you supply any assurance that this probability
will be large?  And if you are thinking of some quite different method of
forging the CRC, could you please explain it?

>                  you CANNOT choose any old "random" polynomial - you have to
>choose one from an appropriate class.

For reasons mentioned above, I think your words "CANNOT" and "have to" are a
bit too strong.  Anyway, I presume you're referring to a restriction on the set
of polynomials (from which the generator is randomly chosen) to the subset of
*irreducible* polynomials.  The reason I didn't mention this in yesterday's
message was that I considered this to be a relatively minor matter compared to
the distinction between a fixed generator and a personal/random generator.
(Recall that the requirement which you quoted was described by me as the *first*
requirement, not the *only* requirement.)
  Since I may have misunderstood something and this might be a more important
point than I thought, it should be mentioned that a CRC checker (the same
program which I mentioned in my message yesterday) has been written which
makes a random choice among almost 70 million irreducible polynomials.  Do you
think anyone can forge a checksum on that basis?  This program is based essen-
tially on Prof. Michael Rabin's "fingerprint" algorithm, and as you yourself
admitted in your contribution of May 9, that makes it cryptographically strong
despite the fact that it is CRC-based.

  Perhaps I could rest my case here, but there are a a couple of additional
details:

>                              Note that to get reasonable security, you need
>a moderately large polynomial, so your software implementation may not be as
>fast as you thought it would be.

The above program uses a 31-bit generator and is at least as fast as any other
checksum program I have tried (except for FluShot+, which probably uses some-
thing more primitive than CRC; in any case it doesn't satisfy my "first" re-
quirement).

>                                                  Using CRC, you can NEVER
>publish lists of checksums.

Since use of a CRC algorithm for the detection of viral infection (which is the
only context in which I mentioned CRC) doesn't imply the need for such a list,
this remark doesn't seem to me to be relevant to my question.  But I'm still
curious to know exactly how one would exploit a list of CRC checksums to do
something nasty.

  In short, Jerry, I don't think you've succeeded in supplying any good justifi-
cation for the much greater execution time required for DES- and RSA-based
algorithms as compared to a Rabin-type CRC algorithm, and unless I've missed
some important point, not even compared to an ordinary CRC algorithm satisfying
my "first" condition.

                                           Y. Radai
                                           Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 08:10:42 CDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Frank San Miguel <ACS1S@UHUPVM1>
In-Reply-To:  Your message of Mon, 29 Aug 88 10:54:21 EDT

Your point is certainly a valid one.  Virtually any programmer with ill will
toward an organization or institution could formulate a virus in a few hours
(or a poorly constructed virus in less time) and crash that system should it
have weak defenses.  It's distrubing to think that such vengeful persons
can easily bring about "viral warfare."  That brings me to another point,
if a war should take place (sensibilities forbiding), how prominently would
viruses be used as a means of attacking an enemy?  This sounds like the plot of
 a cheesy film, but anything's possible.

Frank

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 10:48:33 CDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Frank San Miguel <ACS1S@UHUPVM1>
Subject:      A few questions

I've got two questions concerning Mac viruses.  First, if programs like Ferret
and Vaccine are not as dependable as one could hope, how does one search for a
viral infection using ResEdit?  Also, could someone dig up a copy of Howard
Upchurch's article on SCORES and forward it to me? Thanks.

Frank

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 13:15:41 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Loren K Keim   -- Lehigh University <LKK0@LEHIGH>
Subject:      Who's Sponsoring What

Thank you for answering Ken, but please do not answer questions
you know little about before consulting me.

The conference is sponsored at this time by two organizations
within Lehigh, and I am trying to get a department to sponsor
the conference.  I will be able to tell you later this week
who you may contact within Lehigh for information.

Agreeing with Ken, I am enrolled in the undergraduate program
at Lehigh.  I dislike the term undergraduate because I have worked
in the field for over 6 years and had taken courses at schools
previous to attending Lehigh.  Undergraduates, unfortunately,
often are thought of as people who don't know anything and haven't
spent time working in the real world, so I continue to shy
away from that label.

If you question my integrety, you can check up on me.  I was
a member of the Bethlehem Beautification Committee, a part of
a group to the Bethlehem Area School District Superintendant
Committee, and have served on many non-profit organizations.
I was one of the people who started the "Save our Statue"
fund about 6 years ago that obtained national status.
I am easy to contact through any of the Century 21 Keim
Realtor offices in the Lehigh Valley area, Keim Enterprises.

While all of this means practically nothing, I like to
think I have a decent reputation for being fair and so
on.

I am using a P.O. Box because it is easier for me to
separate mail that way.  If you so desire, I live at
1950 Ravenwood Drive in Bethlehem (Zip 18018).

Again, its very hard for me to assure you that I am
"on the level".  I think tommorrow I may be in a better
position to discuss it, however.

If you have any specific questions, you can direct them
to me here at LKK0@LEHIGH.

Thank you,

Loren K Keim

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 13:13:36 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         "Steven C. Woronick" <XRAYSROK@SBCCVM>
Subject:      Re: Outline of Worm Pgms Paper in CACMM

   For the benefit of the non-expert, could I suggest that we spell out
certain abbreviations which one would anticipate will elicit questions
when they first appear in a message?  For example if I mention DES, my
first reference to it might appear as "Data Encryption Standard (DES)."
(By the way, there is a discussion of DES in the book "Numerical Recipes"
- - sorry I don't have it in front of me so I can't tell you the authors).
Maybe this is too burdensome to ask?  Maybe one us should put together a
glossary?  Although I have already inferred more or less the meaning of
DER and CRC, can somebody please tell me what they stand for?  Finally
what is the name of the journal CACM spelled out?

                                        Steve

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 17:24:37 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Loren K Keim   -- Lehigh University <LKK0@LEHIGH>
Subject:      Virus Conference Concerns Update

To answer some of the concerns people recently had here about
the virus conference:

As I had said before, we were being sponsored by two Lehigh
University organizations but not by the college itself.  We
are working on trying to get the university to sponsor the
conference at this time.  We should know in the next few
days the answer.   The major concern the University seems
to have is that Lehigh must maintain the highest possible
standard of professionalism at a conference, as any
college or university should.

If we are sponsored by Lehigh, then those of you who might
have had questions about integrety will be able to send
a check directly to Lehigh.

Other than that, we seem to have a great list of speakers,
panelists and others coming representing a wide variety
of computer security experts and amatuers.

I will keep you informed.

Thank you,

Loren Keim

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 14:49:00 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         "Jim Shaffer, Jr." <SHAFFERJ@BKNLVMS>
Subject:      Re: Outline of Worm Pgms Paper in CACM

CRC stands for Cyclic Redundancy Check.
CACM is the "Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery."
DER, as far as I know, was an error for DES.  Don't flame me if I'm wrong;
there's getting to be a lot of mail and little time to read it.

--Jim

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 12:07:13 CDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Frank San Miguel <ACS1S@UHUPVM1>
Subject:      Re: Virus Arguements Hit Home
In-Reply-To:  Your message of Tue, 30 Aug 88 11:39:49 EDT

Dueling Sysops.  Sounds like a song subject.
Maybe this question has already been brought up but I'm curious what people's
thoughts are on the subject.  In a recent issue of Computerworld, the subject
of viruses and how they fit into insurance costs was raised.  On one hand,
those paying the insurance feel that they should be compensated for their
losses to viruses since they're paying high bills.  Insurance companies,
though, feel they shouldn't have to pay for another person's behavior.  The
article listed a few companies that do have provisions for viruses and those
who are undertaking the task.  I'll put them up if anyone wants them.

Frank

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 15:30:11 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Jim Marks <JMARKS@GTRI01>
Subject:      Re: Outline of Worm Pgms Paper in CACM
In-Reply-To:  Message of Tue, 30 Aug 88 13:13:36 EDT from <XRAYSROK@SBCCVM>

Steve,

Your suggestion about spelling abbreviations on first use is a good one.  It
is a fairly well recognized standard for reports, etc., and is a good idea
for here.  Only the most EXTREMELY common abbreviations should not be done
this way, at least on the first use.  In reply chains, this should probably
not be necessary.  I, too, am not familiar with all the jargon and abbrev-
iations such as DES.  I do know what CRC stands for, although I don't know
how to use it.

By the way, CACM stands for Communications of the Association for Computing
Machinery (ACM).  This is the primary journal of the ACM.

Jim Marks

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 14:22:01 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Steve <XRAYSROK@SBCCVM>
Subject:      Assurance

   I really cannot understand all the fuss about whether Loren is on the
up and up.  There is not a shred of evidence for, and it is ridiculous to
suggest, that Loren might perhaps embezzle the funds for the conference
and skip town.  The conference money is not very much compared to the
loss of reputation, risk of a law suit, and other damages certain to be
incurred by such a fraud.  I would however suggest (Loren probably already
knows this) that a bank account be established solely for handling the
conference expenses and that Loren obtain and retain all recipts for all
conference-related expenditures.  This is good insurance against later
accusation.  The question about left over monies is a good one, but also
what about not enough funds?  I think Loren deserves to be thanked for
his efforts in setting up and running the conference.  Unfortunately, I
am too busy to attend.

   Life is full of risks and if you want to live a full and normal life
(maybe even otherwise also), you are forced to take at least some risks
all the time.  So, you take risks you consider to be reasonably safe.
It is always possible that your next door neighbor will run you down with
his car just for the fun of it the next time he sees you.  It is possible
that the cashier will pocket the $20 bills you just handed her and claim
that you didn't give her anything (and charge you with assault or robbery
should you try to get your money back).  But life is always forcing these
kinds of risks on you and you must evaluate each risk and the motives and
psychological make up of the people involved.  It has been said that if
you don't take risks, you risk not living.  I personally think the
conference is a pretty good risk.  And a cancelled check is a pretty good
receipt.

Steve

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 16:14:57 CDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Len Levine <len@EVAX.MILW.WISC.EDU>
Subject:      Re: CRC vs. encryption schemes
In-Reply-To:  Message from "Y. Radai" of Aug 30, 88 at 5:20 pm

>
>  A few comments on Jerry Leichter's reply to my question/challenge:
>
>>It may very well be that, given a program P and its CRC C, with an unknown
>>polynomial, I can find another program P' with the same CRC.  Note that this
>>is a MUCH weaker condition than saying that I can determine the polynomial.
>
>Agreed.  I never assumed that one had to determine the polynomial in order to
>forge a CRC.  However, it's not enough to say that "it *may* be that ...".  If
>you can't demonstrate a *method* for doing this in general, you won't convince

Perhaps we have two different concerns here.  One is the problem of
determining if a file that was previously clean had become infected.
For this one needs only to look for changes.  A CRC will do this,
unless the infecting agent is 'smart' enough to add a byte or two of
checksums that will cause the CRC generator to show the same CRC.  No
virus writer can do this if he does not know what CRC polynomial you
are using.

The second problem involves publishing the CRC so that others may know
if distributed code had been changed.  For this, you must also publish
the polynomial so that others can check the code.  Clearly here the
polynomial is known and the virus writer can take that into account as
he writes his mean stuff.

Since in the first case speed is of the essence (I run my checker with
each bootup and it takes time), and in the second case, it is less so,
we have two problems with two solution sets.

+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
| Leonard P. Levine                  e-mail len@evax.milw.wisc.edu    |
| Professor, Computer Science                Office (414) 229-5170    |
| University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee          Home   (414) 962-4719    |
| Milwaukee, WI 53201 U. S. A.               Modem  (414) 962-6228    |
+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 15:06:00 EST
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         "Jerry Leichter (LEICHTER-JERRY@CS.YALE.EDU)" <LEICHTER@YALEVMS>
Subject:      RE: CRC vs. encryption schemes

        Y. Radai writes:

        I never assumed that one had to determine the polynomial in order to
        forge a CRC.  However, it's not enough to say that "it *may* be that
        ...".  If you can't demonstrate a *method* for doing this in general,
        you won't convince many people.

If we were living in the 1930's, this statement might have some validity.
Today, it is extremely naive.  The world is full of failed cryptosystems
which people relied on because "no one could demonstrate a method" of breaking
them.  Given advances in the field, the burden of proof should be - and, among
people who work on these issues, IS - entirely on the PROPOSER of a system to
show that his system is secure, in some sense.  (Absolute proofs of security
are still beyond us, but proofs if certain problems which are believed to be
very hard are, indeed, very hard are possible.)

I suggest you read Kahn's "The Codebreakers" and see if you wish to stand by
your statement.

        Since I may have misunderstood something and this might be a more
        important point than I thought, it should be mentioned that a CRC
        checker (the same program which I mentioned in my message yesterday)
        has been written which makes a random choice among almost 70 million
        irreducible polynomials.  Do you think anyone can forge a checksum on
        that basis?

Yes, easily.  A common error in this kind of work is not to understand the
power of brute force.  Your range of possible polynomials is too small to be
secure.  Suppose I know how your polynomial generator works, and have a copy
of ONE file with your checksum for it.  I proceed to compute the checksum of
the file with all 70 million possible polynomials, comparing the results to
the known checksum.  Even if it takes a second to compute, I can expect a
match in a little over a year.  If I'm serious about the search and willing to
make an investment in hardware, I can get a result much faster, since the
program parallelizes trivially to arbitrary degree.

If I get to chose the file - if, for example, you maintain a BBS and I can
convince you to add my file to your files and publish a checksum for it for
people to check - I may be able to do better.  (At a minimum, I can guarantee
that the file is short and so can be checked quickly.)

What I get out is the actual polynomial - more than I needed.  (There's a
chance - about 1 in a 100 - that two polynomials produce the same checksum on
the given file.  A quick check with another file - if you publish one, you'll
publish another - minimizes this.)

Go to 48-bit polynomials, and this method becomes impractical.  But you don't
KNOW that other methods don't make the problem absolutely trivial!

                     This program is based essentially on Prof. Michael
        Rabin's "fingerprint" algorithm, and as you yourself admitted in your
        contribution of May 9, that makes it cryptographically strong despite
        the fact that it is CRC-based.

I no longer have a copy of my May 9th contribution - I'm fascinated, and
complimented, that anyone thought it interesting enough to save and remember -
but the use of "admitted" in this context is suspect.  It has nothing to do
with proof.  Rabin's scheme was based on an idea that is common in much of his
work, and actually goes back to basic game theory:  Using randomization,
choose one path from among many.  Your adversary can defeat any particular
path you choose, but because he doesn't know which one you will choose, he
must defeat all of them at once - which he cannot do.  Here, "path" is a
particular polynomial.  Rabin's scheme fails immediately if your opponent
knows the particular polynomial you intend to use.

As I recall, I speculated that you could get around this by publishing a list
of polynomials, and checksums with respect to ALL of them, with the list so
long that the adversary could not compute a falsified value that would satisfy
all of them but still have an acceptable length.  Then you would check a
small, randomly chosen subset of the polynomials.

For this to work, a suitable list of polynomials would have to be shown to
exist:  Long enough that fooling all, or even a signficant fraction, of them
simultaneously is impossible; short enough that you would be willing to
compute and publish ALL the checksums.  I don't know of anyone who has shown
that such a list can be constructed; it's an interesting problem.

                                                        -- Jerry

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 19:32:00 EDT
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         "Jim Shaffer, Jr." <SHAFFERJ@BKNLVMS>
Subject:      Loren's virus conference

Could we please take this debate about the conference elsewhere?
I don't know where, maybe a user-run mailing list, but I'm a bit tired of
it on Virus-L.  Probably Jeff is just being over-cautious, and I can't
necessarily blame him.  But this debate has gotten annoying.

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 22:06:11 -0700
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Steve Clancy <SLCLANCY@UCI>
Subject:      conference

What are the possibilities of publishing some sort of proceedings or
recordings of some of the discussions at the upcoming conference for
those of us who can't make the trip?

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 22:11:02 -0700
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Steve Clancy <SLCLANCY@UCI>
Subject:      Re: AT configuration
In-Reply-To:  Your message of Mon,
              15 Aug 88 13:37:42 -0500. <8808151311.aa17665@ORION.CF.UCI.EDU>

 > I wonder what would be the effect of telling my AT, through some
 > configuration changes that I have no hard disk.
 >
 > I can run a program that permits me to tell the battery operated RAM
 > package that I have one of 45 or so different hard disks, or by
 > putting a zero in some location tell it that I have no hard disk.  Can
 > a virus guess what sort of disk I have?  What would happen if the
 > virus guesses wrong?
 >
 > Interested in some feedback here.
 >
 > + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
 > | Leonard P. Levine                  e-mail len@evax.milw.wisc.edu    |
 > | Professor, Computer Science                Office (414) 229-5170    |
 > | University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee          Home   (414) 962-4719    |
 > | Milwaukee, WI 53201 U. S. A.               Modem  (414) 962-6228    |
 > + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - +
 >

There is an interesting program called PC-LOCK which will effectively
isolate your hard disk (at least on an XT) from the system.  Once
installed, if a user attempts a hard disk boot, he/she must supply the
proper password to gain access to the HD.  If booted by a floppy in
the A drive, access is also blocked as the HD does not appear to
exist, and the user does not have access.  This package is shareware.
I would be happy to make it available to all in the conference, but I
am not sure how to do so.

Steve Clancy, U.C. Irvine, Biomedical Library.  Wellspring RBBS 714-856-7996

--------------------

Date:         Tue, 30 Aug 88 22:20:49 -0700
Reply-To:     Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
Sender:       Virus Discussion List <VIRUS-L@LEHIIBM1>
From:         Steve Clancy <SLCLANCY@UCI>
Subject:      Flushot trojan horse

I recently came across this message from the author of Flushot.  I
haven't seen it here, unless I've missed it.

Steve Clancy, U.C. Irvine, Biomedical Library. Wellspring RBBS 714-856-7996

****************************************************************************

                        !!OF VITAL IMPORTANCE!!
ATTENTION!
There is a trojan program afoot and it's called FLU4TXT.COM!

It did not originate from my board, obviously. As of 3/11/88 the most
recent release of the Flushot program is 'Flushot3'.  The archive
contains a number of text files, and FLUSHOT3.COM itself. Legitimate
copies of Flushot3 are available on either of the BBS's below, on Genie,
on Bix, or from Usenet.

ABOUT THE TROJAN

FLU4TXT.COM is a text display program which will show you some of the
documentation which comes with FLUSHOT3, and will then damage your hard
disk when you exit.  Additionally, it also plays games with the disk
parameter table.  Nasty stuff.

The writer of the trojan was clever: it is self modifying and self relocating
code which will not be found by CHK4BOMB.

WHAT TO DO

Please be sure to tell any sysop on any board where you see this program
(or an archive called FLUSHOT4) that it is a trojan, that it should be
removed from their board immediately, and that a warning message should be
posted to that effect.  Perhaps a copy of this warning bulletin will suffice.

!!!DO NOT RUN FLU4TXT.COM!!! IT WILL EAT YOUR HARD DISK *AS*IT*EXITS*!!!

Who do I contact?

If you have questions about flu4txt.COM or about the legitimate series of
Flushot programs, please feel free to leave a message on for me on
either of the following BBS systems:
                RAMNET ((212)-889-6438), NYACC ((718)-539-3338)

or on 'BIX' or via 'MCI MAIL' (I'm user 'GREENBER' on both BIX and MCI)

FLUSHOT3.ARC is available on those bulletin boards as well as many around
you.  Before downloading a copy from a trusted BBS, please be sure to ask
the sysop if they have actually run the copy they have available for
download on their board.  It is *your* disk at risk.....

Ross M. Greenberg

--------------------

*** end of Virus-L issue ***
